InfiniBand Network Monitoring: Challenges and Possibilities by Hintze, Kyle D.
Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFIT Scholar 
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 
3-2021 
InfiniBand Network Monitoring: Challenges and Possibilities 
Kyle D. Hintze 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd 
 Part of the Computer and Systems Architecture Commons, and the Information Security Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hintze, Kyle D., "InfiniBand Network Monitoring: Challenges and Possibilities" (2021). Theses and 
Dissertations. 4902. 
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/4902 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more 




Kyle D. Hintze, Captain, USAF
AFIT-ENG-MS-21-M-048
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the United States Department
of Defense or the United States Government. This material is declared a work of the
U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
AFIT-ENG-MS-21-M-048
INFINIBAND NETWORK MONITORING: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES
THESIS
Presented to the Faculty
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Computer Engineering




APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
AFIT-ENG-MS-21-M-048
INFINIBAND NETWORK MONITORING: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES
THESIS
Kyle D. Hintze, B.S.
Captain, USAF
Committee Membership:
Scott R. Graham, Ph.D.
Chair
Lt Col Patrick J. Sweeney, Ph.D.
Member




The InfiniBand Architecture is among the leading interconnects supporting High Per-
formance Computing. Capable of providing high bandwidth and low latency, Infini-
Band is increasingly found in applications outside the High Performance Computing
domain. One of these is critical infrastructure, encompassing almost all essential sec-
tors as the workforce becomes more connected. InfiniBand is not immune to security
risks, as prior research has shown that common traffic analyzing tools cannot effec-
tively monitor InfiniBand traffic transmitted between hosts, due to the kernel bypass
nature of the IBA in conjunction with Remote Direct Memory Access operations. If
Remote Direct Memory Access over Converged Ethernet is used instead, it is possible
to restore traffic visibility in novel ways. This research shows that this approach,
together with an InfiniBand capable adapter, allows common traffic analysis tools to
be used to monitor network traffic without unnecessarily sacrificing the bandwidth
and performance of InfiniBand.
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INFINIBAND NETWORK MONITORING: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES
I. Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
While the capabilities of modern processors continue to improve via optimizations
of current architectures or the introductions of new ones, other computing technolo-
gies have not been able to keep pace. In particular the majority of industry-standard
Input/Output (I/O) bus systems can not keep up with the raw power of today’s mod-
ern processors [1]. A possible solution to this deficit came from the InfiniBand Trade
Association (IBTA), and the resulting InfiniBand Architecture (IBA) interconnect
technology. Boasting higher bandwidth and lower memory latency compared to the
Ethernet protocol, the IBA stands as a powerful technology with promising capabil-
ities. According to the most recent ranking by Top 500 (a list that tracks the 500
most powerful supercomputers in the world), seven out of the top 10 supercomputers
on Earth are utilizing the IBA [2].
In an information-driven society, network communications are key, providing one
of the main avenues of operations for critical infrastructure. As InfiniBand becomes
adopted it becomes necessary to evaluate security issues in the IBA, as seen in the
following research efforts [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. This research effort focused on expanding the
monitoring capability of the IBA. In particular, this research evaluated the capability
of common traffic analyzers on the Remote Direct Memory Access over Converged
Ethernet (RoCE) protocol created by the IBTA and how effectively they can capture
InfiniBand network traffic. The analysis of the case studies presented is intended to
1
guide future research into securing an InfiniBand-based network.
1.2 Problem Statement
Increasing computing speeds are likely to lead to applications of InfiniBand beyond
the High Performance Computing (HPC) domain. As seen in other widely used
technologies, it is somewhat inevitable that the IBA will be subjected to attacks by
malicious cyber actors. A key component to mitigating these attacks is the capability
to passively monitor the network traffic to detect such attacks. While some research
has been conducted on monitoring high speed networks, it is limited, particularly
with regards to the IBA [8, 9, 10]. Most is geared towards the HPC domain [3, 4,
5, 6, 11]. This research expands on prior work that investigated whether certain
network security systems were effective on InfiniBand programs. Included now are
network monitoring tools with the goal of finding a complete network security system
that provides security and performance. In particular this study evaluates whether
Mellanox’s BlueField Data Processing Unit (DPU) SmartNIC is capable of providing
the support needed for an effective security environment. An analysis of this work
may help guide future research in securing an InfiniBand network.
1.3 Research Objectives
The research presented in this thesis evaluates key elements in monitoring an In-
finiBand network, possible tools and underlying factors that affect their performance,
and suggests possible solutions. Three case studies were performed to determine if
modern network monitoring tools can be effectively applied to InfiniBand. Nvidia
Mellanox adapters were explored to establish their monitoring capabilities and limi-
tations. The research objectives for this thesis are outlined below.
• Understand the key parameters of the IBA, in particular its communication
2
model and packet generation and how this affects traffic monitoring.
• Research IBA applications in typical environments and how trends in computing
suggest its rapid adoption in other industries.
• Establish how the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
framework, in particular the Identify and Detect stages can be applied as best
practices regarding InfiniBand monitoring.
• Integrate modern, open-source network monitoring tools into an Infiniband net-
work and evaluate their performance and effectiveness in meeting criteria set
for monitoring an InfiniBand network.
• Define a network monitoring solution based on the results and explain how it
can be used to monitor InfiniBand network traffic.
In pursuit of these objectives, the questions to be answered by this thesis are:
• Are network monitoring tools, built for lower speed Ethernet networks, effective
on higher speed IBA-based networks?
• Do the network monitoring tools impose any negative impacts on an InfiniBand
network?
• Are there advantages to monitoring the network from the InfiniBand Network
Interface Card (NIC)?




The organization of this thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter II introduces the
IBA, its main concepts and features, and the components that enable its high speed
network capabilities. Technologies relevant to the IBA or used in this thesis are
discussed. The NIST framework is discussed and how it applies to monitoring an
InfiniBand network that will later be used to define a network monitoring framework.
Additionally, related work in IBA security is introduced as a basis for this thesis.
Chapter III is organized into three case studies that enumerate challenges to effec-
tively monitor InfiniBand network traffic. The test-bed, network configuration, and
monitoring tools used are introduced and discussed. The motivation behind each case
study is listed and explained and the experimental set-up and execution is discussed.
Chapter IV analyzes the results of each case study and the challenges presented by
each configuration. The issues arising from each experiment are shown and discussed
in detail. Additionally, Chapter IV explores a potential network monitoring solution
based on the observations. It defines the desired capabilities the solution must possess
and possible hardware to implement them. After an analysis of the proposed solutions
capabilities, it observes that combining Ethernet traffic with RoCE operations, in
conjunction with an InfiniBand capable NIC allows for effective network monitoring
at high speeds using the InfiniBand protocol.
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the work. It suggests routes for future research
in InfiniBand security and how they can contribute to the protocol. A discussion of
the benefits of this research and any drawbacks and challenges encountered are also
presented.
4
II. Background and Related Work
2.1 Overview
This chapter presents background information about the IBA and discusses rel-
evant technologies associated with this research effort. It begins by reviewing the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, in particular Identify and Detect, and how these
definitions will help in laying the groundwork for a network monitoring solution for
the IBA. Next, the IBA is presented together with a discussion of the components and
concepts of the protocol which are essential to this research. Next, several technologies
used during experimentation are discussed. Finally, relevant research in InfiniBand
security is highlighted to show other ares of interest that have been explored and how
they support the goals of this work.
2.2 Cyber Security Framework
Through the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2014, the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) was given the task to identify and develop
cybersecurity risk frameworks for voluntary use by critical infrastructure owners and
operators in the United States [12]. Instead of a one-size-fits-all approach to manag-
ing cybersecurity risk, the NIST framework outlines a flexible approach to protecting
critical infrastructure. This approach is useful to large private entities and govern-
ment organizations working to protect their assets, as well as individual researchers
developing ways to better secure a protocol like InfiniBand.
The NIST framework consists of three categories; Profiles, Implementation Tiers,
and the Core. The Framework Implementation Tiers provide context on how an or-
ganization views cybersecurity risk and the processes in place to manage that risk.
Consisting of four tiers, this framework describes an increasing degree of rigor and
5
sophistication in cybersecurity risk management practices [12]. A framework profile
enables organizations to establish a road map for reducing cybersecurity risk that is
well aligned with the organizations’ goals. Split between Current and Target profiles,
the former indicates cybersecurity outcomes currently achieved, while the later indi-
cates outcomes still needed to achieve desired cybersecurity risk management goals
[12]. Finally, the framework core (the primary focus of this research), has four areas:
functions, categories, subcategories, and informative references. Functions organize
cybersecurity activities at their highest level. There are five defined Functions, with
Identity and Detect being the primary functions explored in this research [12]:
• Identify - Develop an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity
risk to systems, people, assets, data, capabilities.
• Protect - Develop and implement appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of
critical services.
• Detect - Develop and implement appropriate activities to identify the occur-
rence of a cybersecurity event.
• Respond - Develop and implement appropriate activities to take action regard-
ing a detected cybersecurity incident.
• Recover - Develop and implement appropriate activities to maintain plans for
resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to
a cybersecurity incident.
These functions allow an organization to manage its cybersecurity risk and offer
avenues to learn from and improve upon cybersecurity practices currently employed.
6
2.2.1 Network Monitoring Requirements
Using the two functions, Identify and Detect from the NIST framework and sup-
plemental documentation, together with a requirement that no proposed solution to
monitoring InfiniBand may impose negative effects on the network, a network moni-
toring framework can be outlined, as listed below [12, 13]:
• Identify - This function lays a foundation for identifying possible risks to an or-
ganization and performing risk management to help mitigate them [12]. While
the true meaning of identify in regards to the NIST framework does not com-
pletely fit with this research’s aim, it nevertheless suggests a basis for what the
monitoring solution should be aware of, namely the threats to the InfiniBand
network; what they might look like, who may be trying to compromise it, and
what steps can be taken to help mitigate the risk posed by these malicious
actors.
In an ideal world, a monitoring solution would be able to capture 100% of all
network traffic and be capable of processing this data to identify important
information about a network. While having all network traffic could give one
insight to the happenings within a network, only a small portion of network
traffic is needed to determine how a particular network is organized. In prac-
tice even a small percentage, perhaps 1% of network traffic can reveal important
information [13]. Therefore, this research specifies that a monitoring tool cap-
ture at least 10% of all network traffic in a specified time frame to meet this
requirement.
• Detect - This function guides efforts to implement appropriate activities to
identify cybersecurity events [12]. Detection systems are focused on identifying
possible incidents, logging information about them, attempting to stop them,
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and reporting them to security administrators. Most of the supporting docu-
ments regarding the detect function do not label a general threshold, such as a
percentage of network traffic captured, to be considered meeting the detect re-
quirement. Instead, it is more organization dependent, determined by the users
and what they consider detrimental to their organization. For this research,
considering the high volume of data being transmitted in a given experiment,
and how some attacks could be hidden by large volumes of network data, the
threshold for meeting the detect function will be set at 80% of all traffic sent in
a set time frame.
• Negative Impacts to Network - Not only should the solution be able to know
what the attacks to the InfiniBand network could be and be able to detect them,
but the solution must not inadvertently degrade the network. In this research,
packets can be dropped either by the InfiniBand hardware or monitoring tools
themselves. What is important to determine is if packets lost are due to issues
specific to the hardware or monitoring tools themselves, or if the tools are also
causing packets to be lost before reaching the intended destination (i.e. the
tools themselves are degrading network performance). InfiniBand is designed
to achieve very high bandwidths, therefore a viable monitoring solution must
not cause significant bandwidth loss.
2.3 The InfiniBand Architecture
InfiniBand is a network protocol, providing networking services much like Ether-
net, that is quickly becoming the standard for many HPC clusters and data centers.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, seven out of the top ten supercomputers in the world are
now using the IBA as the core interconnect [2]. Even more telling is the growth of
InfiniBand further down the performance spectrum, where the IBA has increased its
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share of the Top 500 Supercomputer interconnects from 28% in 2019 to 31% in 2020
[2], as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Top Supercomputer Interconnects
Year Interconnect: Counter Share (%)












At first glance, the IBAs small increase in interconnect share may not seem sig-
nificant. However, if the share of performance by interconnect is observed instead, it
can be seen that InfiniBand holds 40% of the total max Floating Point Operations
Per Second (FLOPS), as seen in Table 2. Over the last four years, InfiniBand has
increased its share of the performance by 13%.
Table 2. Top Supercomputer Interconnects Performance
Year Interconnect: GFlops Share (%)





Myrinet 1975070 < 0.1
While similar to the Ethernet protocol in several ways, InfiniBand was designed
to handle higher network bandwidth at a significantly reduced memory latency. This
came as a direct response to the inability of traditional I/O systems to provide the
bandwidth required to keep up with the improvements in modern computing technol-
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ogy. By treating I/O as communications, using point-to-point connections and trans-
ferring information between hosts and devices through messages instead of memory
operations, IBA is able to achieve higher performance [14]. A high-level view of a
generic InfiniBand network is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. InfiniBand System Fabric
2.3.1 InfiniBand Hardware
An InfiniBand network consists of many of the same components and connections
found in Ethernet. A NIC connects to workstations, and processors handle certain
network traffic workloads. Fundamentally, it is an interconnect, allowing for mul-
tiple processors, switches, and other devices to communicate with one another. In
particular, in the IBA, the Channel Adapter (CA), the switch, and the Subnet Man-
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ager (SM) play crucial roles, differentiating an InfiniBand network from its Ethernet
counterpart.
2.3.1.1 Channel Adapters
The CA connects InfiniBand to other devices and comes in two forms, a Host
Channel Adapter (HCA) or a Target Channel Adapter (TCA). Both forms of CAs
are able to generate and consume packets. An HCA allows for functions specified by
InfiniBand Verbs (described later) while a TCA uses an implementation dependent
interface to the transport layer. A visual representation of these differences is shown
in Figure 2 [15].
Figure 2. IBA Architecture Layers: HCA vs. TCA
What sets a CA apart from a normal interconnect interface, like that of Ethernet,
is its capability of being a programmable Direct Memory Access (DMA) engine. This
allows DMA operations to be made locally, on hardware and independent of the
Central Processing Unit (CPU). Additionally, to identify devices within the network,
each CA is assigned a Local Identification (LID) by the SM and a Globally Unique
Identification (GUID) by the manufacturer, directly analogous to Interface IDs and
Media Access Control (MAC) addresses used in the Ethernet protocol [15].
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All CAs communicate via Work Queues (WQs), consisting of multiple sub-queues
[15]. WQs are initiated by the client, (sending NIC) where the traffic to be sent
is placed in the queue. After this, the CA processes the received information from
within the Send Queue (SQ) and then sends the information to the requesting de-
vice (receiving NIC). Once received the receiving NIC returns a status response to
the sending NIC through a Completion Queue (CQ). Multiple queues can exist at
any given time, allowing a client to continue other activities while transactions are
processed by the CAs [16].
2.3.1.2 Switch
Similar to Ethernet, a switch in an InfiniBand network is responsible for forward-
ing decisions, acting as the fundamental routing component for intra-subnet routing
[15]. Data is forwarded from one CA to another based on addresses at the data link
layer. Forwarding decisions are made based upon CA LIDs (analogous to MAC ad-
dresses in Ethernet) and the switch’s forwarding table, which is configured by the SM
at startup. IBA switches also allow for forwarding packets via unicast and multicast,
enabling support for Internet Protocol (IP) applications.
2.3.1.3 Subnet Manager
A key component in an InfiniBand network, the Subnet Manager (SM) is respon-
sible for configuring and managing all switches, routers and CAs within the subnet
[11, 15]. Multiple SMs can exist within the network, with one holding the role of
master SM; other SMs will be held in a fallback role in case of SM failure. The SM
communicates with every switch, CA and Subnet Managment Agent (SMA) to ensure
that all routing and forwarding tables are correct. The master SM is responsible for
the following actions:
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• Discover the subnet topology.
• Configure each CA port with LIDs, GUIDs, subnet prefixs, and Partition keys.
• Configure each switch with a LID, subnet prefix, and forwarding database.
• Maintain the endnode and service databases for the subnet and provide a GUID
to LID resolution service.
2.3.2 InfiniBand Software Architecture
The IBA is compatible with all major Operating Systems (OSs). The IBA is
abstracted away from user space to allow for consumers to interact with InfiniBand
without knowledge of the processes ongoing in kernel space. At a high level, the
InfiniBand Software Stack can be separated into the hardware, kernel and application
level as represented in an IP scenario in Figure 3 [16].
Figure 3. InfiniBand Software Stack
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The hardware level is where the physical components exist in the network (i.e.
I/O), exchanging electromagnetic waves along copper or fiber waveguides. Here con-
nections are made between a multitude of host devices in varying configurations to
provide for network communications. As with Ethernet communications, InfiniBand
network traffic enters and exists through these access points before moving farther
into the host machine.
Moving into kernel space, the physical components (the HCAs) are controlled by
I/O drivers to allow for user space applications to directly control the hardware. An
application is executed in user space, through which the device driver maps to an
operation [17]. In doing so, a user can take advantage of a wide array of InfiniBand
capabilities. At the next level in kernel space, the core kernel modules provide the
main services of the IBA. Here important services such as the Verbs Application
Programming Interface (API) and Subnet Administrator Client (SAC) reside [16].
It is through these services that InfiniBand distinguishes itself from its Ethernet
counterpart. Finally, at the top of kernel space sits the upper layer protocols that
allow existing user applications to take advantage of the IBA.
2.3.2.1 InfiniBand Verbs
InfiniBand Verbs are the service through which the user can communicate to the
HCA via software. Verbs do not specify the API for the OS, but define the operation
for OS vendors to develop a usable API [16]. Verbs describe the parameters necessary
for configuring and managing the CA, allocating Quene Pairs (QPs), configuring QP
operations, posting work requests to the QP, and getting completion status from the
CQ.
When an InfiniBand protocol is used it generates a work request using verbs. A
work request may be to load or store memory using Remote Direct Memory Access
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(RDMA) operations. Verbs will work with the host OS to describe the IBA operations.
Once the work request has been made via the verb, it is subsequently placed in a
send or receive queue where it will traverse the network to its destination, after which
other layers of the stack will further service the request. A visual representation of
this process using verbs is shown in Figure 4 [18].
Figure 4. Work Request using Verbs
2.3.2.2 InfiniBand Transport Services
While InfiniBand offers many transport services, this research focuses primarily
on its use of RoCE and IP over InfiniBand (IPoIB). In an Ethernet network, packets
will traverse the protocol stack, which involves the host OS kernel. The kernel pro-
cesses packets and determines where to send them, consuming multiple clock cycles
of the CPU in the worst case, leading to lowered bandwidth throughput. A visual
representation of packet decisions by the kernel is shown in Figure 5 [19].
The IBA avoids this limitation by using RDMA. RDMA is the direct access of
memory from one machine to another, without direct CPU involvement. This means
that the system’s OS kernel is bypassed completely, allowing data transfers to be done
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Figure 5. Linux Message Path in the Kernel
by applications directly from user space. User applications can move data directly
between virtual memory on different network nodes without the OS intervention
[20]. In using RDMA the CPU is used to initiate the communication channel, after
which the user application and hardware performing the message passing take control.
Throughout the entire process, verbs are used that convey requests to the hardware.
This study focuses on RoCE v1, which replaces the physical and data-link layers of the
InfiniBand protocol stack with Ethernet [20]. RoCE is capable of the same speeds and
low-latency as RDMA and comes in two versions: RoCE v1 allows for communications
between two hosts in the same Ethernet broadcast (link-layer protocol) while RoCE
v2 allows for packets to be routed outside of a Local Area Network (LAN) (network-
layer protocol).
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Since RoCE uses Ethernet as its link-layer protocol, this allows for the use of
IPoIB [21]. IPoIB is an upper layer protocol that implements a network interface over
the IBA. IPoIB encapsulates IP datagrams over an InfiniBand transport service [7].
Once the appropriate kernel modules have been loaded, the service can be enabled
using standard Linux tools such as ifconfig or ip. These will give a standard IP
address to the chosen interface. Any application that is configured to use IPoIB will
still traverse the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) stack
within the kernel [7].
2.3.3 InfiniBand Network Stack
Similar to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network model, the IBA stack
is composed of multiple layers: Physical, Link, Network, Transport, and Upper [16].
Each layer operates independently of one another, and also provides a service the
next layer above it in the stack. InfiniBand’s network layers are shown in Figure 6.
Each layer is outlined below:
• Physical Layer - The physical layer is what establishes the physical con-
nection between end nodes in an InfiniBand network. It specifies how bits are
placed on the wire to form packets and how they are aligned [15]. Specific to In-
finiBand, the physical layer defines three link speeds, 1X, 4X, and 12X, ranging
from 4 Gbps up to 48 Gbps, fully duplexed [16].
• Link Layer - The link layer describes the packet format and protocols for
packet operation, flow control and how packets are routed within a subnet [15].
Two types of packets exist here, management and data packets. Management
packets are used to configure links and maintenance while Data packets carry
information with up to 4K bytes of data per payload [16].
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Figure 6. InfiniBand Network Stack Layers
Switching and packet forwarding is handled in the link layer. At system startup,
the SM assigns all devices within the network a LID. When packets are sent,
the LID is used for addressing, not unlike IP addresses. In combination with a
Local Router Header (LRH), these form the addressing portion of packets sent
within the subnet.
The IBA link layer provides flow control via a credit based system [15, 16]. In
the network, a receiver sends credits to the transmitter on the other end of
the link. This value indicates the number of data packets that the receiver can
accept. Packets will not be sent unless the receiver signals credits that indicate
its receive buffer has space available for new data.
Finally, the IBA link layer provides data integrity via two types of Cyclic Re-
dundancy Check (CRC) per packet: a 16 bit Variant CRC (VCRC) and a 32
18
bit Invariant CRC (ICRC). The VCRC includes all fields in the packet and is
recalculated at each hop, providing link level data integrity between two hops.
The ICRC covers only the fields that do not change across hops and provides
end-to-end data integrity [16]. An overview of a standard IBA packet is shown
in Figure 7 [14].
Figure 7. Complete IBA Packet Format
• Network Layer - The network layer specifies how to route packets between
subnets in an InfiniBand network. Packets get routed by InfiniBand routers,
and reach their destinations via the Global Route Header (GRH). The GRH
identifies the source and destination ports using a Global ID (GID) in Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) address format. As packets travel through subnets,
the InfiniBand routers will modify the contents of the GRH and replace the
LRH, but the source and destination GIDs do not change and are protected by
the ICRC field. Beginning at the source, the InfiniBand router places the GID
of the destination in the GRH and the LID in the LRH. Upon arriving at the
destination, the final router replaces the LRH using the LID of the destination
[15].
• Transport Layer - This is where the network and link layer deliver packets
to the desired destination, the transport layer ensures the packet arrives at
the proper QP and instructs the QP how to process the packet’s data. If a
packet exceeds the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU), the transport layer is
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responsible for segmenting the data into the appropriate sizes. Within a packet
exists the Base Transport Header (BTH), that specifies the destination QP and
indicates the operation code, Packet Sequence Number (PSN), and partition.
The operation code identifies if the packet is the first, last, intermediate, or only
packet of a message and specifies if the operation is an RDMA send, write, read
or atomic. The PSN is established and incremented each time the QP creates
a new packet [15].
2.3.3.1 InfiniBand Network Transaction Flow
When a user wants to send a message through an InfiniBand capable adapter,
the user interacts with an IBA CA through QPs, that themselves consist of a SQ
and Receive Queue (RQ). From here a work request will be generated that places a
Work Queue Element (WQE) in the SQ. Next, the CA detects and accesses the WQE
where it interprets the command, validates the WQE’s virtual addresses, translates it
to physical addresses, and accesses the message data. From here, appropriate headers
are added to the packet by the CA, as well as splitting of the message if the MTU is
exceeded, before the packet is sent out on the wire. Finally, upon the packet arriving
at its destination, any appropriate acknowledgements are sent by the receiving end
QPs and if the last packet of the message is received the CA will retire the WQE [15].
A visual representation of a work request being made and overall InfiniBand packet
travel can be seen in Figures 4 and 8 [15].
2.4 Relevant Technologies
While the InfiniBand protocol is the primary focus of this research, several tech-
nologies are used through this work. In the following sections, the network monitor-
ing and bandwidth tools used, Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIE),
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Figure 8. IBA Communication Stack
DPUs and the virtual switching software Open Virtual Switch (OVS) are discussed.
2.4.1 Network Monitoring and Bandwidth Tools
This research makes uses of multiple software tools. For actual monitoring of
InfiniBand network traffic, the tools wireshark/tshark, tcpdump, and ntopng are used.
All three are open-source and widely used for network traffic monitoring. The network
monitoring tools all use a packet capture library, such as libpcap, which allows packets
to be captured from a live network device or file. In general, these libraries will poll for
suitable devices, gain control of them, and then begin to filter and capture incoming
network packets. In addition to libpcap, ntopng also uses the library PF Ring, which is
a newer type of network socket, developed by ntop to dramatically improve the speed
of packet capture. In newer versions of the library it states that packet capture speeds
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above 10Gbit and even up to 100Gbit are possible, on multiple network adaptors, with
lower packet loss.
Figure 9. Vanilla PF RING Packet Capture Library Vverview
As seen in Figure 9 [22], PF Ring polls packets from the NIC by means of the
Linux New Application Programming Interface (NAPI), which copies packets from
the hardware to a circular buffer. From here incoming packets can be distributed to
multiple rings simultaneously drastically improving packet capture speed and lowering
packet loss [22].
For traffic generation and bandwidth testing, the tool iperf is used extensively
in this research. Iperf is capable of reporting multiple metrics important to network
health, including, but not limited to, bandwidth, latency, jitter, and datagram loss.
In the simplest set up, a server is created that opens up a socket to receive traffic and
a client is made to send traffic at a specified interval and bandwidth. The following
command will configure a client to send TCP/IP traffic at specified bandwidths and
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report the average bandwidth at one second intervals:
$ iperf -c <ip address> -t 120 -i 1
The following command will set up a server to accept TCP/IP traffic at specified
bandwidths and report the average at one second intervals:
$ iperf -s -i 1
2.4.2 Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
PCIE is a high-speed serial computer expansion bus standard, capable of high
bandwidth. PCIE is a switched lane architecture that operates more like a network
than a bus. It has an internal switch that controls several point-to-point serial con-
nections to communicate packets. Each device in the computer that needs data has
its own dedicated connection lane via the interconnect, thereby forgoing the need to
share bandwidth. Each lane of a PCIE connection contains two pairs of wires: a send
and receive, that is capable of sending a specified number of bits per cycle (listed as
x1, x2, x4, x8, x16, and x32). In this research, generation 4 PCIE at x16 lane width
is used, allowing for a theoretical bandwidth rate of 256 Gbps of data. In practice
this will be much lower due to overhead and other system specifications that degrade
the bandwidth performance.
2.4.3 Linux Device Drivers
This research makes use of the Linux OS on both host machines and the Nvidia
Mellanox Connect-X 5 adapters. Since device drivers are what allow the hardware to
be able to communicate with the software, the internals of Linux device drivers are
discussed below. Device drivers are distinct black boxes that allow a particular piece
of hardware to respond to a well-defined internal programming interface [17]. When
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a user requests an action, it is carried out by a means of standardized system calls,
within kernel space, independent of the specific driver. One feature of Linux is the
ability to extend at run-time the set of features offered by the kernel, this includes
creating loadable kernel modules. In this research, the majority of device drivers used
are implemented as loadable kernel modules, and upon being loaded are represented
as device files that the user can directly interact with. All devices used can be looked
up and interacted with via the Command Line Interface (CLI) because of the modular
nature of the device drivers.
2.4.4 Data Processing Unit
This research makes extensive use of the Nvidia Mellanox BlueField SmartNIC,
that hosts the BlueField DPU System on Chip (SoC) on board. A DPU is a newer
class of programmable processors that combines three elements to differentiate it-
self from a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) and CPU. Namely, a high-performance,
programmable, multi-core CPU, a NIC, and a set of programmable acceleration en-
gines capable of offloading applications. While a DPU can be used as a stand-alone
embedded processor, it currently finds most use incorporated with programmable
SmartNICs. Currently, most DPUs are capable of the following:
• High-speed networking connectivity at speeds of 100 Gbps and higher.
• High-speed packet processing, aided by hardware accelerators.
• Multi-core processors, typically from the ARM family.
• Hardware accelerators used for enhancing cryptography and high-speed storage
offloads.
• Allow for the running of an OS separate from the host machine that the Blue-
Field is installed on.
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A visual representation of the BlueField DPU used in this research is shown in
Figure 10 [23]. As mentioned before, as high network bandwidths become more
common place, more processing power is needed in order to handle them. When
paired only with a CPU or GPU, that is already handling a multitude of workloads,
any extra processing related to network traffic, especially at gigabit speeds, is going
to cause some amount of degradation. While not the only reason, this is a major
factor in the increasing appearance and use of DPUs and their place in high speed
networks is likely to endure.
Figure 10. BlueField DPU Architecture
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2.4.5 Open Virtual Switch
OVS is a multi-layer software switch, providing security, monitoring, Quality of
Service (QOS) and automated control. Its main purpose is to provide a switching
stack for hardware virtualization environments [24]. By existing virtually, OVS pro-
vides the majority of features a physical switch provides, along with some of its own.
OVS consists of eight core elements:
• ovs-vswitchd - The daemon that implements the switch.
• Linux kernel module - For flow-based switching.
• ovsdb-server - A lightweight database server.
• ovs-dpctl - A tool for configuring the switch kernel module.
• ovs-vsctl - A utility for querying and updating the configuration of ovs-vswitchd.
• ovs-appctl - A utility that sends commands to running OVS daemons.
• ovs-ofctl - A utility for controlling the OpenFlow features of OVS.
• ovs-pki - A utility for creating and managing the public-key infrastructure.
In this experiment, OVS allows network traffic from the host client to be directed
through the ARM cores of the Bluefield and then out onto the wire, as shown in
Figure 14. This provides an opportunity to directly manipulate and monitor traffic
out-of-band, among other capabilities that a software stack allows.
In addition to acting as a virtual switch, OVS allows for the high bandwidth at-
tributed to the IBA via hardware offload. In a traditional network stack, all incoming
packets (represented by red lines) are processed via the OS kernel, as shown in Figure
5. Since the CPU must inspect each packet before forwarding to its destination, this
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results in a much lower bandwidth and is very CPU intensive. As shown in Figure
11, together with OVS hardware offload, Mellanox’s Connect-X adapters are able
to free up the host workstation CPU and achieve higher bandwidth. In this setup,
the first packet reaches the OVS daemon and kernel module within user and kernel
space. From here OVS will make the decision to offload all subsequent packets to the
Mellanox hardware.
Figure 11. OVS offload Frees up CPU to Provide Performance Benefits
2.5 Related Work in IBA Security
Early research into the security of the IBA revealed several vulnerabilities with-
out known mitigation solutions. While significant effort was spent in improving band-
width and latency performance, less effort was spent in securing the network, arguably
due to its use in HPC settings. Listed below are some of the security research efforts
and their relevant findings.
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2.5.1 A Framework for Cyber Vulnerability Assessments of InfiniBand
Networks:
This research conducted a cyber vulnerability assessment on an IBA network to
learn the possible vulnerabilities that may exist in the IBA [3]. The research states
that since the IBA was designed as a data center technology, logically separated
from the Internet, standard defensive mechanisms such as packet encryption were not
implemented. As with many new technologies, the assessment concluded that, while
security holes do exist in the IBA, most bad actors have not taken significant interest
in InfiniBand. The author goes on to warn that this may change as the IBA is more
widely adopted, and this may come to fruition as InfiniBand now comprises over 70%
of supercomputers [2]. However, IBA remains resistant to cyber attacks.
2.5.2 Implications and Limitations of Securing An InfiniBand Net-
work:
This research showed that network packets crafted using InfiniBand verbs are
unable to be monitored by standard networking monitoring tools [7]. Differing from an
Ethernet network, InfiniBand traffic uses the set of semantics called verbs to describe
operations that take place between an HCA and consumer (receiver of network traffic)
[15, 20]. In combination with other aspects of the IBA, these allow traffic crafted with
verbs to bypass the OS kernel to achieve the IBA’s high bandwidth and low latency
through RDMA operations. An unfortunate aspect of this is that modern traffic
analyzers cannot sniff these network packets because they never traverse the TCP/IP
stack in the kernel. Ultimately the research concluded that the key to securing an
InfiniBand network may reside in hardware offload.
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2.5.3 Security Enhancement in InfiniBand Architecture:
This research highlighted the IBAs promising features for clusters and Storage
Area Networks (SANs) [5]. It further pointed out the IBA specifications lacked suf-
ficient security features, leaving it vulnerable to possible exploitation. The authors
stated the most serious vulnerability in the IBA was the lack of authentication of net-
work traffic since InfiniBand authenticates packets solely by checking the existence
of plaintext keys in a packet. A new authentication mechanism was proposed that
treated the ICRC field as an authentication tag that is compatible with the current
IBA specification. Upon implementation, the authors found the new tag enhanced
the IBAs authentication capabilities without hampering its performance and incurred
only marginal performance overhead.
2.6 Summary
This chapter began by providing a brief overview of the NIST cybersecurity frame-
work and the core functions used in this research. Following this, the chapter de-
scribed the basic concepts and protocols of the IBA, including the hardware and
software architecture. Additionally, relevant technologies used in this research were
discussed, including the network monitoring and bandwidth testing tools, device in-
terconnects and drivers, as well as the processing units and switching software used.
Finally, recent literature concerning InfiniBand security was discussed and the con-
clusions made in each were presented.
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III. InfiniBand Case Studies
3.1 Objective
The research objective of this thesis is to characterize the ability of common net-
work traffic analyzers to monitor an InfiniBand network, with emphasis on Ethernet
and the RoCE protocol. Past research concerning InfiniBand occurred within the
HPC domain and focused primarily on its architecture. Security aspects, such as net-
work monitoring, remain largely unexplored. Thus, to obtain this knowledge, three
case studies are performed, exploring mechanisms for monitoring an InfiniBand net-
work. In particular, this work examines the difficulties in using common network
traffic analyzers on an InfiniBand network to showcase the limitations of monitoring
the InfiniBand protocol. Additionally, the thresholds laid out previously for a net-
work monitoring solution for InfiniBand are examined, in regards to the requirements
of Identify, Detect, and Negative Impacts.
3.1.1 Testbed Setup
While the IBA allows for both InfiniBand and Ethernet (using RDMA and RoCE,
respectively), Ethernet was chosen as the link layer protocol for this study. Previ-
ous research into the limitations of security applications on the InfiniBand proto-
col already determined that InfiniBand itself cannot be monitored without security
penalties [7]. As they are currently the largest producer of InfiniBand hardware in
the market, Nvidia Mellanox equipment is used for these experiments. However, the
experiments outlined in this work should be applicable to other InfiniBand capable




The experimental setup consist of two host workstations, powered by an Intel Xeon
Silver 4114 processor (2.2 Ghz, 10 Cores, 20 Logical Processors) with 128GB of RAM.
Each workstation is running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS 64-bit, kernel version 5.0.4-56-generic.
3.1.1.2 Network Configuration:
The network configuration used in this study is shown in Figure 12. The two
host workstations each have a Connect-X 5 adapter installed. Each adapter will
be connected ”back-to-back” via a 100 Gbps Active Optical Cable (AOC). For this
research, no switch is required, and the link layer protocol used is Ethernet, allowing
for RoCE operations to be used.
Figure 12. Network Diagram of RoCE 100Gbps with Connect-X 5 Adapter
3.1.1.3 BlueField DPU Programmable SmartNIC:
Within each workstation, an Nvidia Mellanox BlueField SmartNIC is installed.
The SmartNIC contains 16 ARMv8 A72 cores and 16GB of RAM. Each card uses a
Connect-X 5 adapter as the HCA which acts as the physical interface for the network.
Each card is running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS 64-bit [25]. Additionally, the BlueField
has two modes of operation as shown in Figure 14. In the default Separated Host
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mode, both the host workstation and SmartNIC ARM OS act as separated entities,
communicating with each other or with the network via the Connect-X 5 module
of the SmartNIC. In SmartNIC mode, the host workstation communicates with the
network via the SmartNIC ARM cores. When the host workstation sends data into
the network the packets are sent via the PCIE interface, into the NIC where it is
received by the virtual interface pf0hpf (this is the host-workstation-facing interface
of OVS). The packets are processed by the OVS virtual switch and then sent out on
the network-facing interface p0. Finally, the packets are then sent to the Connect-X
5 HCA which sends the packets out onto the network. For this research SmartNIC
mode is used [26].
At initial startup, the BlueField is defaulted to Separated Host mode and needs
to be changed to SmartNIC mode. To do this the following commands are issued to
the Mellanox OpenFabrics Enterprise Distribution (OFED) drivers.
$ mst start
$ mlxconfig -d /dev/mst/mt41685_pciconf0 s INTERNAL_CPU_MODEL=1
First, mst start loads the appropriate kernel modules and saves PCI configuration
headers in the appropriate directories. Next, mlxconfig is invoked which allows the
user to change device configurations without changing the firmware on board. Once
invoked, this command tells the CPU mode (indicated by 1 here) to be changed for
the device (the BlueField) designated by mt41685.
Before being able to send network traffic from host workstation to host worksta-
tion, OVS needs to be invoked to bridge the virtual interfaces p0 and pf0hpf. At its
default, network traffic can be sent to the host-facing network interface pf0hpf, but it
is not connected to anything, so no traffic will ever make it out onto the wire. To fix
this the following commands are issued to OVS on the BlueField:
32
$ ovs-vsctl add-br ambr1
$ ovs-vsctl add-port ambr1 p0
$ ovs-vsctl add-port ambr1 pf0hpf
In these commands, ovs-vsctl is invoked to created a bridge called ambr1. Once
created, the ports p0 and pf0hpf are then added to the bridge as shown below in
Figure 13. Once completed, network traffic now flows from host workstation, through
the ARM cores on the BlueField and then finally out onto the wire to its destination.
Figure 13. OVS Bridge on BlueField
3.1.2 Data Collection and Metrics
For this research, several metrics were collected and analyzed across all case studies
to analyze the efficiency of the monitoring tools, as shown below:
• Bandwidth: Each case study will report the average bandwidth in each iperf
trial to determine how much TCP/IP traffic is being sent from client to server
and show that the monitoring tools are not imposing negative effects on the
network.
• Packets Received: Each case study will report the number of packets received
by the monitoring tools.
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Figure 14. BlueField Modes of Operation
• Packets Dropped: Each case study will report the number of packets dropped
by the monitoring tools.
• Data Consistency: Each case study will report the standard deviation, mean,
and coefficient of variation for all runs performed. In doing so, an analysis of
how consistent each run was can be made.
Additionally, a baseline was set using the Linux utility ip on the server host
machine. The tool ip can report many statistics, but for this study its ability to
show received and dropped packets will be used. While the ip tool will drop some
packets, overall it captures 99% of all TCP/IP traffic coming into, and out of the
client host machine. With that in mind, the number of packets dropped as a result
of the monitoring tools not being capable of handling the influx of traffic can be
collected.
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3.1.3 Monitoring Tool Requirements Evaluation
As stated earlier in Section 2.2.1, three requirements were established to meet
the threshold for a possible monitoring solution for an InfiniBand network. In each
case study several monitoring tools are used in varying configurations to test their
effectiveness at monitoring InfiniBand traffic. How each monitoring tool used in this
research will be evaluated on meeting all the listed requirements is listed below:
• Identify - To meet this requirement, a threshold of 10% of all network traffic
captured during the trial duration must be met. While each monitoring tool
captures network traffic in slightly different ways, metrics common to all include
received packets, dropped packets, and bandwidth. Each case study runs a
specific number of trials at varying bandwidths for each monitoring tool. To
calculate captured network traffic, the following steps are applied according to
each case study:
1. Perform specified number of trials at each bandwidth level, for each mon-
itoring tool.
2. Record the number of received and dropped packets reported by each mon-
itoring tool.
3. Account for the baseline packets dropped at each bandwidth level, for the
monitoring tool being analyzed.
4. Calculate the mean number of received and dropped packets, at each band-
width level, for each monitoring tool.
5. Divide the mean dropped packets by the mean received packets for each
bandwidth level.
6. Check if 10% threshold is met.
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• Detect - To meet this requirement, a threshold of 80% of all network traffic
captured during the trial duration must be met. As stated previously, each case
study will run a set number of trials at varying bandwidths for each monitoring
tool. To calculate captured network traffic, the following steps were applied
according to each case study:
1. Perform specified number of trials at each bandwidth level, for each mon-
itoring tool.
2. Record the number of received and dropped packets reported by each mon-
itoring tool.
3. Account for the baseline packets dropped at each bandwidth level, for the
monitoring tool being analyzed.
4. Calculate the mean number of received and dropped packets, at each band-
width level, for each monitoring tool.
5. Divide the mean dropped packets by the mean received packets for each
bandwidth level.
6. Check if 80% threshold is met.
• Negative effects to Network - To meet this requirement, an average band-
width level within 5% of the bandwidth used for each trial must be met. In
order to calculate average bandwidth, the following steps are applied according
to each case study:
– Bandwidth Loss - Repeat these steps for each bandwidth being tested for
the required number of runs.
1. For each bandwidth level, perform trial using iperf without monitoring
network traffic, for the monitoring tool being used.
36
2. Record average bandwidth as reported by iperf.
3. For each bandwidth level, perform trial using iperf with the monitor-
ing tool being used.
4. Record average bandwidth as reported by iperf.
5. Compare the average bandwidth from each trial to determine if they
are within 5% of each other.
3.2 Case Study 1: Host-based Monitoring, Hardware Offload Enabled
The first case study tests if current network monitoring tools can monitor Infini-
Band applications. For this study, tcpdump and wireshark are used. tcpdump uses the
CLI while wireshark uses a Graphical User Interface (GUI). A visual of the network
configuration for this case study is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Network Configuration for Case Study 1
Under typical conditions, an InfiniBand application using RDMA would bypass
the OS kernel and therefore be hidden from network monitors. Nvidia Mellanox
adapters could employ vendor tools such as the ”Offloaded Traffic Sniffer” to capture
the TCP/IP packets on the desired interface [7]. However, because Ethernet is used
as the link layer protocol for this research, thus using the RoCE protocol for DMA
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operations, it can be shown that network packets can be captured without these
custom tools on Nvidia Mellanox and other vendor specific hardware. In general,
capturing network traffic that used RDMA or RoCE is the same. Both use DMA
operations, the main difference lies in using either InfiniBand or Ethernet as the
link layer protocol for network communications. The main benefit of RoCE is that
no specific tool is needed to monitor the incoming traffic. Any common network
monitoring tool can see TCP/IP traffic on the NIC interface with RoCE, a benefit
arising from using Ethernet as the underlying link layer protocol.
This case study uses the InfiniBand/Ethernet 100GbE with BlueField Connect-X
5 Adapter network configuration. A total of 50 trials are performed, five for each of the
two monitoring tools, at each of the five bandwidth levels. In each trial, iperf will be
used to send TCP/IP packets and report the average bandwidth. The trial duration is
120 seconds, reporting the average bandwidth at one second intervals throughout the
trial. Hardware offload is enabled for this case study and the bandwidth level is varied
from 1, 3, 5, 10 and 25 Gbps. The goal is to determine whether the monitoring tools
can capture the TCP/IP traffic at bandwidths at and above 1 Gbps, as bandwidths
above this tend to result in a large volume of lost and dropped packets.
3.2.1 Test Steps:
1. Configure host machines to enable IPoIB, allowing network traffic to be sent
via Layer 3.
2. Start iperf Receiver on the server host at desired bandwidth limit.
3. Initiate network monitoring tool on server host and specify appropriate interface
to capture packets.
4. Run iperf Sender on the client host to send TCP/IP packets to receiver.
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5. After 120 seconds of capture, terminate network monitoring tool.
6. Record 120 bandwidth samples captured in trial run.
7. Repeat steps 2-5 for remaining bandwidth trials.
Upon test completion, the baseline number of received and dropped packets, as
stated in Section 3.1.2, is compared to the number of received and dropped packets
from the case study. The number of dropped packets reported by ip is subtracted
from the number of dropped packets reported by the monitoring tool.
Next, each bandwidth levels trial is measured for the variation of the data col-
lected. To do this a statistics test of the Standard Deviation (SD), mean number
of dropped packets, and the Coefficient of Variation (CV), is reported. For this and
subsequent case studies, if the CV is less than 10% then it will be assumed that the
data collected was consistent across all bandwidth level trials.
3.3 Case Study 2: BlueField Monitoring, Hardware Offload Disabled
This case study examines the monitoring capability throughput of current net-
work monitoring tools when tasked with monitoring InfiniBand applications from the
BlueField itself. In this scenario a degree of anonymity is gained as network traffic
is captured from the NIC hardware as opposed to the host workstation. The tools
for Case Study 2 are set-up similar to those in Case Study 1. However, because
the BlueField only has a CLI, the study relies on tshark, which is the command line
equivalent of wireshark. Another tool, ntopng was later added to test the capability
of a flow-based traffic analyzer, a capability arising from the BlueField having OVS
in its Linux installation. A visual of the network configuration for this case study is
shown in Figure 16.
39
Figure 16. Network Configuration for Case Study 2
The main purpose of ntopng is to act as a collector for NetFlow records that will be
configured on, and sent from OVS on the BlueField. NetFlow is a network protocol,
originally developed by Cisco for collecting IP traffic information and monitoring net-
work flow. For this Case Study, OVS on the BlueField is configured to send NetFlow
records to a collector (ntopng) which is located on the server host machine. From
here the collector analyzes the flow and updates network statistics for observation
and analysis in a web browser on the client host machine. The command to enable
NetFlow records on OVS to be sent to a collector is shown below:
$ ovs-vsctl -- set Bridge ambr1 netflow=@nf -- --id=@nf \
create NetFlow targets=\"192.168.1.30:5566\" \
active-timeout=30
In this command, ovs-vsctl is invoked first, and the bridge ambr1 is assigned a
NetFlow that is identified as nf. This bridge connects the virtual interfaces pf0hpf and
p0, as seen in Figure 14. The command specifies that the NetFlow record is sent to
the collector at the IP address 192.168.1.30 via port 5566. Finally, an active timeout
of 30 seconds is set, splitting the flow data into several packets, with one flow of
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data arriving every 30 seconds. Additionally, OVS is configured to disable hardware
offload, in order to verify that the monitoring tools are capable of capturing packets at
lower bandwidth speeds. To disable hardware offload in OVS the following command
is issued:
$ ovs-vsctl set Open_vSwitch . other_config:hw-offload=false
For this experiment, the InfiniBand/Ethernet 100GbE with BlueField Connect-X
5 Adapter network configuration is used. As in Case Study 1, iperf is used to send
TCP/IP traffic and report average bandwidth. 45 trials are run, five for each monitor-
ing tool and at each bandwidth. The trial duration is 120 seconds and bandwidth is
varied to 1, 3, and 5 Gbps. The reason this case study has hardware offload disabled
(and consequently why it is capped at 5 Gbps as opposed to 25 Gbps) is because
TCP/IP traffic cannot be captured by the BlueField with it enabled. When a packet
capture is initiated on the BlueField and then later viewed for analysis, the only
captured traffic is RoCE operations. This is because only the first packet reaches the
OVS daemon, all subsequent packets are instructed to be offloaded to the Connect-X
5 NIC as seen in Figure 11. At the packets’ destination (server host workstation),
TCP/IP traffic is able to be seen in a parallel packet capture on the server host. Due
to this, hardware offloading must be disabled to see any traffic on the BlueField for
this case study.
3.3.1 Test Steps:
1. Configure both server and client host machines to enable IPoIB, which allows
network traffic to be sent via Layer 3.
2. Start iperf Receiver on the server at desired bandwidth limit.
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3. Initiate network monitoring tool on BlueField and specify appropriate interface
to capture packets on.
4. Run iperf Sender on the client to send TCP/IP packets to Receiver.
5. After 120 seconds of capture, terminate network monitoring tool.
6. Record 120 bandwidth samples captured in trial run.
7. Repeat steps 2-5 for remaining bandwidth trials.
As in Case Study 1, the number of dropped packets reported by the ip utility is
subtracted from the number of dropped packets reported by the network monitoring
tools. This is done to correct for packets not dropped by the monitoring tools them-
selves. Additionally the statistics test done in Case Study 1 is also performed here to
observe if the data collected was consistent among all tests.
3.4 Case Study 3: BlueField Monitoring, Hardware Offload Enabled
This Case Study examines monitoring capability throughput of InfiniBand ap-
plications from the BlueField itself at maximum bandwidth. The tools and set-up
are similar to Case Study 2, however OVS is now configured to allow for hardware
offload. A visual of the network configuration for this case study is shown in Figure
17. As shown in Figure 11, hardware offload allows for network traffic to be handled
by the HCA instead of having to traverse the host OS kernel, freeing the CPU of
intensive operations and improving bandwidth. To enable hardware offload in OVS
the following command is issued:
$ ovs-vsctl set Open_vSwitch . other_config:hw-offload=true
With hardware offload enabled, the full bandwidth of the Connect-X 5 adapter
and InfiniBand applications can be achieved. The previously mentioned network tools
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Figure 17. Network Configuration for Case Study 3
can be evaluated for how effectively they monitor InfiniBand applications. For this
case study, the InfiniBand/Ethernet 100GbE with BlueField Connect-X 5 Adapter
network configuration is used. Once again, iperf is used to send TCP/IP traffic and
report average bandwidth. A major difference from the previous case studies is the
number of trials and tools. Only ntopng is used in this case study and the bandwidth
is varied to 1, 3, 5, 10, and 25 Gbps for a total of 25 trials, five for each bandwidth
speed. The reason for only using ntopng is due to the previous case studies revealing
that wireshark and tcpdump were incapable of handling high bandwidths. However,
this was not the case for ntopng therefore it is the only tool used in this case study.
3.4.1 Test Steps:
1. Configure both server and client host machines to enable IPoIB that allows
network traffic to be sent via Layer 3.
2. Start iperf Receiver on the server at desired bandwidth limit.
3. Initiate ntopng on BlueField and specify appropriate interface to capture pack-
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ets on.
4. Run iperf Sender on the client to send TCP/IP packets to Receiver.
5. After 120 seconds of capture, terminate network monitoring toolntopng trial
run.
6. Repeat steps 2-5 for remaining bandwidth trials.
3.5 Summary
This chapter described the experimental set-up and test process of this thesis.
It presented how each host workstation was configured as well as how to correctly
configure the InfiniBand network. Additionally, the BlueField was described and the
methods to correctly set it up was explained. Next the three case studies that were
conducted were presented. Each case study’s goal was explained and steps to set up
the experiments and collect data were described.
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IV. InfiniBand Case Studies Results
4.1 Overview
This chapter highlights the results of the three case studies performed. First, the
results of the baseline packet loss test, performed before each case study, is discussed.
This shows the percentage of network packets lost due to the hardware and OS alone,
without any network monitoring tools used. Following this, each case study’s results
are presented and discussed. A short recap of each case studies goal is presented, fol-
lowed by the subsequent results. Each case study’s percentage of packet loss is shown
and discussed. Additionally, the network monitoring tools used for each case study
are evaluated based on the requirements of Identify, Detect, and Negative Impacts.
Finally, the results of the last case study are used to present the software and hard-
ware set-up suggested by this research for a monitoring solution for an InfiniBand
network.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Packet Loss Baseline
Before starting the case studies, a baseline of packets dropped by the OS kernel
was done using the Linux tool ip, running on the server host machine. Regardless of
the network monitoring tool used, some packets will be dropped by either the server
host OS kernel, or the hardware interface receiving packets. While many factors can
contribute to a packet being dropped or lost, this commonly happens due to hardware
issues (such as faulty cables or hardware not capable of routing effectively), software
issues, and insufficient bandwidth to name a few. Due to this reality, at the beginning
of each case study, a bandwidth test was conducted using iperf at each bandwidth
level used in the case study. Once completed the number of packets dropped were then
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Table 3. Baseline Packet Loss Reported by ip
Study Bandwidth Packets Received Packets Dropped Percent Dropped
Case Study 1 1 Gbps 10414492 0 0.0%
3 Gbps 31242709 153 0.1%
5 Gbps 52070648 193 0.0%
10 Gbps 104137417 5212 0.5%
25 Gbps 225989529 10987 0.5%
Case Study 2 1 Gbps 10414521 0 0.0%
3 Gbps 31242631 148 0.1%
5 Gbps 52070535 199 0.0%
Case Study 3 1 Gbps 10414537 0 0.0%
3 Gbps 31242595 177 0.1%
5 Gbps 52070499 201 0.0%
10 Gbps 104136650 5170 0.5%
25 Gbps 260115117 11086 0.4%
subtracted from the total number of dropped packets reported by each monitoring
tool to normalize comparisons.
The data collected is shown in Table 3. It can be seen that at each bandwidth level
tested, less than 1% of all packets during the test were dropped, well within acceptable
standards. With this data applied to the results of the network monitoring tools in
each case study, it is possible to make a better claim on the effects of using the
monitoring tools, most importantly whether they are imposing any negative effects
on the network. While it is expected that the tools will drop some packets, due to
any number of factors, it is not desirable for the monitoring tools themselves to be
degrading the network. Again, using these baseline numbers provides a better overall
picture of the effect of the tools on the InfiniBand network.
4.2.2 Case Study 1: Results
This study was designed to explore the capabilities of common network monitoring
tools on an InfiniBand network. The first test used the network analyzers wireshark
and tcpdump to attempt to capture packets on the server host machine (192.168.1.30).
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In all cases, the tools were able to capture TCP/IP traffic on the host workstations,
as shown in Figure 18.
Figure 18. Wireshark Analysis of Captured InfiniBand Packets
However, further analysis shows that when increasing the bandwidth, the ability
to capture all traffic begins to diminish. What starts as trivial at 1 Gbps becomes
ineffective at max bandwidth. As seen in Figure 19 both monitoring tools begin to
drop off in effectiveness quickly once bandwidth is increased to 3 Gbps. Notably,
wireshark begins to drop off dramatically at 5 Gbps and is incapable of keeping up at
higher bandwidths. Tcpdump performs better than wireshark above 3 Gbps, however
it still drops a large percentage of packets. A monitoring tool drops packets when the
buffer space allocated to it by the OS fills up [27].
Following the overall performance of the network monitoring tools, a look at the
statistics of all dropped packets resulting from each bandwidth test gives an estimate
of collection accuracy. As stated in Section 3.1.3, a total of 50 trials were performed,
with five conducted at each bandwidth level, for each monitoring tool. The mean of
dropped packets at each bandwidth was calculated, followed by the SD of the dropped
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Figure 19. Comparison of Dropped Packets at Varying Bandwidths on the Host Server
packets. Then, by dividing the SD by the mean number of dropped packets, the CV
was calculated. As shown in Table 4, the CV column shows that all tests were under
a CV of 5%. The CV is a measure of the SD relative to the mean, allowing a simple,
unit-less measure of the spread of the collected data. For this experiment, this implies
that data collected was generally consistent across all trial runs and, barring possible
outliers, additional runs will most likely produce similar results.
Next, an analysis of how well each tool met the requirements for a monitoring
solution was performed. Recall that the three requirements involved are Identify,
Detect, and Negative Impacts to Network. As shown in Table 5, both wireshark and
tcpdump are only able to meet all three requirements at a bandwidth of 1 Gbps.
Ideally all requirements would be met for each bandwidth speed. The ability to
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Table 4. Case Study 1 Packet Loss: Data Variance
Monitoring Tool Bandwidth Packets Dropped - Mean of Packets Dropped - Std. Dev. CV
Wireshark 1 Gbps 3.1% 493.25 2.4%
3 Gbps 33.3% 1079.03 0.2%
5 Gbps 54.9% 5450.47 0.2%
10 Gbps 76.5% 2488.52 0.1%
25 Gbps 90.0% 46663.91 0.0%
TCPDump 1 Gbps 7.4% 372.61 0.8%
3 Gbps 35.5% 5240.27 0.7%
5 Gbps 43.6% 9643.42 0.7%
10 Gbps 53.0% 169169.98 4.7%
25 Gbps 70.8% 229920.93 2.9%
monitor InfiniBand traffic at a maximum speed of 1 Gbps is not helpful when typical
InfiniBand speeds are in the tens and hundreds of gigabits per second.
Table 5. Case Study 1: Monitoring Tool Requirements Performance











At the conclusion of Case Study 1, the overall packet loss of each monitoring tool
and the variation of those lost packets have two implications. First, network traffic
created using Ethernet and RoCE operations can be captured using common network
monitoring tools. As shown in Figures 18 and 19 as well as Table 4, both monitoring
tools were capable of receiving the network traffic. Second, unfortunately, at speeds
above 1 Gbps, the monitoring tools are ineffective at capturing all network traffic.
Both wireshark and tcpdump begin to drop well over 30% of all incoming packets
beginning at 3 Gbps and this only worsens with increased bandwidth. This implies
49
that while traffic capture is possible, very high speeds are still an issue for common
network monitoring tools. Additionally, as shown in Table 5, the monitoring tools do
not meet the requirements outlined earlier for a monitoring solution for an InfiniBand
network, implying the need for another solution for successful traffic monitoring.
4.2.3 Case Study 2: Results
Case Study 2’s purpose was to determine if the same monitoring tools used to
capture InfiniBand traffic on the host workstation could function on the BlueField
NIC. With hardware offload enabled, TCP/IP traffic was not able to be captured
on the BlueField itself. As shown in Figure 20, the first packet that was captured
is the initial TCP/IP packet, while every subsequent packet is offloaded to the NIC.
Following this, only RDMA operations can be seen. While this is interesting and
provides insight into how the BlueField is operating, the capability to see packet data
is unfortunately lost. Further study required disabling the hardware offload feature.
Once hardware offload was disabled, the test was performed according to the
procedure described in 3.3. As seen in Figure 21, tshark and tcpdump are incapable of
effectively capturing all traffic, with tshark dropping a minimum of 65.7% of packets
and tcpdump effectively dropping all. Most interesting is ntopng’s results showing
very minimal packet loss. In order to confirm that the count of packet loss was
accurate, the number of packets reported by the monitoring tools was compared
with the Linux tool ethtool which reports numerous statistics on traffic received on
a specified interface. This confirmed that the reported metrics from the monitoring
tools were accurate. Additionally, ntopng allows for the live capture of packets in
specific time intervals, which also confirmed minimal packet loss by examining the
pcap files.
Next, as in Case Study 1, a comparison of the dropped packet statistics at each
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Figure 20. Packet Capture of RoCE Traffic on the BlueField with Hardware Offload
Enabled
bandwidth level was completed. As stated in 3.3, a total of 45 trials were performed
(not 50 trials as in Case Study 1, due to two bandwidth levels not being tested because
of limitations from hardware offload), with five conducted at each bandwidth level
for each monitoring tool. As previously, the mean number of dropped packets at each
bandwidth level was calculated, along with the SD and CV. As shown in Table 6, the
CV column shows that all tests were under a CV of 6%. As stated in 3.2 this implies
that it is safe to conclude that all data collected was consistent across all trial runs
and, barring any outliers, additional trials will most likely produce similar results.
Next, as in Case Study 1, an analysis of how each tool met the requirements for
a monitoring solution was accomplished. As shown in Table 7, tshark and tcpdump
fail to meet all three requirements for all bandwidth levels. However, ntopng met
the requirements outlined at each bandwidth level, suggesting that ntopng could be
capable of monitoring an Infiniband network at high bandwidth, which is expanded
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Figure 21. Comparison of Dropped Packets at Varying Bandwidths on the BlueField
Table 6. Case Study 2 Packet Loss: Data Variance
Monitoring Tool Bandwidth Packets Dropped - Mean Packets Dropped - Std. Dev. CV
Tshark 1 Gbps 65.7% 2043.18 0.4%
3 Gbps 88.2% 19554.85 0.9%
5 Gbps 98.2% 90484.81 2.8%
TCPDump 1 Gbps 98.6% 10687.54 1.5%
3 Gbps 98.9% 31744.95 1.3%
5 Gbps 98.2% 16916.16 0.5%
Ntopng 1 Gbps 1.3% 492.94 5.1%
3 Gbps 1.3% 1231.38 4.1%
5 Gbps 1.4% 1050.55 2.1%
upon in Case Study 3’s results.
The packet loss of each monitoring tool observed in Case Study 2 has several
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Table 7. Case Study 2: Monitoring Tool Requirements Performance










implications. First, when using standard network monitoring tools, the hardware
offloading capabilities of the BlueField are not available. In this configuration, the
ability to see individual TCP/IP packet data is lost. Second, network traffic created
using Ethernet and RoCE operations can be captured using common network moni-
toring tools on the BlueField when hardware offload is disabled, albeit only at lower
bandwidths. As shown in Figure 21 and Table 6, both monitoring tools were capable
of receiving network traffic. Finally, capturing traffic effectively is not possible via
tshark and tcpdump. Looking at Figure 21 tcpdump and tshark drop over 99% of
network packets at maximum bandwidth. This points to a need for another method
for monitoring network traffic.
Fortunately, ntopngs results are promising. At each bandwidth level, only a small
percentage of packets are dropped; slightly over 1%. (Dropped here implies they
were not captured and processed by the network interface). The consistency of each
test and the efficiency of the network monitoring tool suggest that ntopng and its
flow-based traffic monitoring capability may be a promising alternative option for
monitoring InfiniBand traffic. The possibility of combining the offloading capabilities
of the BlueField and the efficiency of ntopng at higher bandwidth was the focus of
Case Study 3.
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4.2.4 Case Study 3: Results
Case Study 3’s purpose was to determine if ntopng, after showing promising results
monitoring InfiniBand traffic on the BlueField in Case Study 2, could monitor IBA
traffic on the BlueField at higher bandwidths. As in the prior case studies, all other
monitoring tools explored dropped significant percentages of packets as bandwidth
increased. This is likely due to either the packet capture library being slow, copying
packets between user and kernel space, or buffer space within the kernel OS over-
flowing quickly. Case Study 2 showed that ntopng captured InfiniBand traffic very
effectively up to 5 Gbps. As stated in 3.3, ntopng is a flow-based monitoring tool. In
this experiment ntopng executes on the server host workstation, while the flow data
is configured on and sent from the BlueField via OVS. Thus, it seemed possible that
hardware offload could be taken advantage of (to obtain high bandwidth speeds) and
still monitor from the BlueField itself without losing the ability to see packet data.
Upon performing the trials, not only were TCP/IP packets visible, and captured
at all bandwidths, but ntopng dropped very few packets during testing. As shown in
Figure 22 from 1 Gbps up to 25 Gbps, ntopng only dropped between 1.3% to 2.6% of
all network packets. To confirm that packet loss was accurate, the number of packets
reported by ntopng was compared with the Linux tool ethtool running on the server
host machine, as in Case Study 1. An inspection confirmed that ntopng was seeing
all generated traffic and that its reported metrics were accurate.
Next, as in Case Study 1 and 2, a comparison of the statistics of the dropped
packets at each bandwidth level was completed. As stated in 3.4, 25 tests were run,
with five conducted at each bandwidth. As previously, the mean of each bandwidth
level test’s dropped packets were calculated, with the SD and CV of the dropped
packets calculated as well. As shown in Table 8, the CV column shows that all trials
experienced a CV of no more than 5%. As stated in 3.2 this implies that it is safe
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Figure 22. Dropped Packets at Varying Bandwidths on the Host Server Using Ntopng
to conclude that data collected was consistent across all trials and, barring outliers,
additional trials would likely produce similar results.
Table 8. Case Study 3 Packet Loss: Data Variance
Monitoring Tool Bandwidth Packets Dropped - Mean Packets Dropped - Std. Dev. CV
Ntopng 1 Gbps 1.3% 466.00 5.0%
3 Gbps 1.3% 1040.50 3.7%
5 Gbps 1.4% 347.24 0.7%
10 Gbps 1.4% 317.27 0.3%
25 Gbps 2.6% 1765.02 0.4%
Next, as in the previous case studies, an analysis of how each tool met the require-
ments for a monitoring solution was performed. As shown in Table 9, ntopng met
every requirement at each bandwidth level. In all cases, over 97% of network traffic
was captured, and average bandwidth was within 1% of expectation. This suggests
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that ntopng is potentially capable of effectively monitoring an InfiniBand network.
Table 9. Case Study 3: Monitoring Tool Requirements Performance






In summary, at the conclusion of Case Study 3, the overall packet loss of ntopng at
the varying bandwidth levels has several implications. First, network traffic created
using Ethernet and RoCE operations can be captured using ntopng on the BlueField.
Hardware offload could be enabled on the BlueField, allowing for high network speeds,
and packet data was viewable in the packet capture files. Second, based on the
results shown in Figure 22 and Table 8, it can be concluded that ntopng and its
implementation of a packet capture library in conjunction with the Mellanox hardware
has drastically reduced packet loss. Compared to wireshark and tcpdump from Case
Study 1, packet loss has decreased at max bandwidth by over 95% in both cases.
There are several possibilities that could explain why this could be happening.
The first, and probably simplest explanation is that ntopng uses the packet capture
library PF Ring and, as stated in 2.4.1, this newer library allows for much faster
packet capture speeds. This is mostly possible due to the circular buffer which allows
incoming packets to be distributed to multiple rings simultaneously. At very high
bandwidths, packets are coming in extremely fast, at well over hundreds of millions
of packets per second. Being able to distribute these to multiple buffers at the same
time could lead to lower overall packet loss for the network. Second, it is possible that
since the information being sent is coming from the BlueField, via OVS and sent to
the ntopng collector on the host server workstation, that not involving the host server
workstation CPU as intensively is freeing processor power to process incoming packets.
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In typical network traffic, the CPU will process incoming packets and determine where
they should be sent. Normally an intensive process, when multiplied by hundreds of
millions of packets the hit to bandwidth performance becomes more profound at
higher speeds. Any offload from the host server workstation should lead to some
performance improvement on network bandwidth.
4.3 Monitoring Software and Hardware Set-up
The set-up for this possible solution is fairly simple. Each host workstation in
the network that will not strictly monitor InfiniBand traffic would need a NIC that
has a DPU capable of the high speeds and offloading capabilities of the BlueField.
As stated in 2.4.4, DPUs are typically deployed in high speed network environments
where bandwidth, packet processing and encryption are desired. These features meet
the Identify and Detect functions as well and only further the need for a DPU in
this set-up. Additionally, they will have a some form of OS installed that supports a
virtual switching software similar to OVS. This will allow for flows, like NetFlow or
Sflow, to be configured to be sent off the NIC. Recall that most flow-based protocols
enable the ability to not only monitor network traffic on a separate host, but provide
for a much higher level of network visibility to aide in network analysis. A simple,
visual representation of this set-up is shown in Figure 23. Finally, a host workstation
would need to act as the collector of the flow data. As was shown in Case Study 3,
ntopng took on this role (though another tool with the same capabilities could be
used). This open-source monitoring tool was used to interpret the incoming flow and
InfiniBand traffic and then present it in a way that a user could analyze.
Based on the capabilities of the monitoring tools and the results found in Case
Study 3, one should be able to monitor InfiniBand traffic at line rate without loss
of fidelity in the network. While this does not cover every potential avenue, it is an
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Figure 23. Example InfiniBand Network Monitoring Set-up
important start for a comprehensive security set-up for an InfiniBand network.
4.4 Summary
This chapter analyzed the results of the three case studies regarding the capabil-
ities of network monitoring tools on an InfiniBand network. Case Study 1 demon-
strated that common network monitoring tools can capture InfiniBand traffic using
Ethernet and RoCE operations, however at very high bandwidths their effectiveness
is diminished. Case Study 2 showed that attempting to capture InfiniBand traffic
directly from the BlueField NIC yielded similar results for the same monitoring tools,
capturing the traffic but dropping almost all packets. Notably, a newer monitoring
tool, ntopng had excellent performance and presented itself as a possible solution to
monitoring InfiniBand traffic. Case Study 3 took and tested its network monitoring
capabilities at very high bandwidths and yielded very low packet loss. In conjunction
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with a high speed, InfiniBand-capable adaptor, this tool provides a possible network
monitoring solution for an InfiniBand network. The three case studies concluded that
typical network monitoring solutions do not translate well to an InfiniBand network,
however by using Ethernet as the link layer protocol together with a monitoring tool




This chapter summarizes the work performed for this research concerning the
capability of monitoring an InfiniBand network. It reiterates the motivation behind
monitoring an InfiniBand network and how it is possible to retain the benefits of
InfiniBand without compromising on performance. It discusses the benefits of the
monitoring solution proposed while also highlighting any drawbacks and challenges
that existed during experimentation. The chapter closes by discussing the significance
of the research performed as well as future work that needs to be done to ensure the
overall security of an InfiniBand network.
5.2 Summary
This research focused on the ability to passively monitor an InfiniBand network
and the challenges associated with this task. It described the features of the IBA,
including the key hardware components, software and network architecture unique to
InfiniBand. The NIST cybersecurity framework was discussed and three key functions
were identified as requirements for a network monitoring solution for an InfiniBand
network. Related work involving the IBA and its current level of security was pre-
sented to lay a foundation for why this research’s goals were an important basis for
an overall security solution for the IBA.
This thesis consisted of three case studies, each revealing the capabilities of com-
mon network monitoring tools as applied to the representative InfiniBand network.
Case Study 1 explored the ability to monitor InfiniBand traffic using Ethernet as
the link layer (and the RoCE protocol) in conjunction with hardware offload, on the
server host workstation. Results obtained in Case Study 1 highlighted that com-
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mon network monitoring tools are capable of monitoring InfiniBand traffic that uses
Ethernet as the link layer. However, these tools were shown to be incapable of ef-
fectively capturing all network traffic at speeds above 1 Gbps. All monitoring tools
tested dropped a significant number of TCP/IP packets. This case study proved that
common monitoring tools are only marginally effective at capturing InfiniBand traffic.
Case Study 2 tested the ability to monitor the same type of InfiniBand traffic in
Case Study 1, but now on the BlueField SmartNIC and analyzed the efficiency of
the monitoring tools. Case Study 2 demonstrated that the same network monitoring
tools used in Case Study 1, but directly implemented and executed on the BlueField
SmartNIC, are capable of capturing InfiniBand traffic. However, they drop a signif-
icant number of packets. Unfortunately, the advantages of hardware offload are not
available, as evidenced by the results of this case study; the only traffic captured by
these tools came from RDMA operations performed by the hardware. Interestingly
enough, one of the new tools, ntopng, a flow-based monitoring tool, was not only
capable of capturing the InfiniBand traffic, but was also able to capture the majority
of TCP/IP packets with minimal packet loss. This case study showed the promise for
a different type of monitoring tool and showed the need to further test it at higher
bandwidths.
Case Study 3 observed the capabilities of a flow-based monitoring tool at high
bandwidths in conjunction with hardware offload. The same tool was configured
to accept flow data from the BlueField SmartNIC, to the ntopng collector on the
server host workstation at bandwidths up to 25 Gbps. Not only could the tool cap-
ture traffic at these high speeds, but it was also able to drop a minimal number of
TCP/IP packets, just as in Case Study 2. Case Study 3 determined that a potential
monitoring solution for an InfiniBand network could reside in a flow-based tool like
ntopng, using Ethernet as the link layer protcol, and RoCE operations. Finally, a
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brief but simple introduction to a monitoring solution for a InfiniBand network was
introduced. Using the Identify and Detect functions from the NIST framework, the
necessary requirements for this solution were described and the hardware needed was
introduced.
5.3 Discussion
Below we discuss the contributions of this research, as well as limitations that
were encountered during experimentation, and issues concerning security:
5.3.1 Benefits
The benefit of a viable network monitoring solution for a high speed network like
InfiniBand is being able to apply low-cost, but reliable and proven security tools.
These already exist in most standard network installations, but high speed networks
bring with them more challenges. With InfiniBand already present in the top ten
supercomputers in use today, a usable security solution can be the catalyst to main-
stream adoption of InfiniBand, bringing the benefits of fast data transfer with it.
5.3.2 Limitations, Challenges & Security
While this set-up shows promise, it has limitations. Ideally, traffic in the net-
work would be sent to a mirrored port, away from the main network, to be discreetly
monitored. However, the current implementation of OVS imposes a significant perfor-
mance degradation when applying port mirrors. In testing, bandwidth never exceeded
5Gbps with this implementation. Additionally, research into offloading IP Security
(IPsec) to the InfiniBand hardware may prove fruitful. This capability would greatly
increase the security of InfiniBand traffic, but it is not present in the current genera-
tion of the BlueField processor. It should be noted that currently released information
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from Mellanox states that the next iteration of the BlueField will have this capability
[28].
5.4 Future Work
As the IBA becomes more prevalent in industry, and the evolving threat of cyber-
security incidents continues unabated, there are other areas that should be researched
and explored. Listed below are areas of interest that could expand on this research:
• 100 Gbit Line Rate Encryption: The hardware used throughout this thesis
was Nvidia Mellanox’s BlueField SmartNIC, the first iteration of their DPU
family of InfiniBand capable hardware. While this SmartNIC had many ca-
pabilities, it was limited in others, specifically in offloading IPsec encryption.
Prior research showed that IPsec operations impose a large performance hit
on InfiniBand, and concluded that the BlueField’s offloading capabilities could
solve this [7]. While partially true, the BlueField was missing the hardware ac-
celerators to make this possible. During this research Nvidia Mellanox released
the BlueField 2 SmartNIC which claims to be able to perform IPsec encryption
by offloading to the NIC hardware, at 100 Gbit speeds [28]. Research into test-
ing the offloading capabilities of the BlueField 2, supported by the information
discovered in monitoring InfiniBand traffic in this thesis would be useful.
• Security SDK: Nvidia Mellanox developed a Security SDK that acts as a
Deep-Packet inspection tool. Used in conjunction with a monitoring solution
that can see InfiniBand traffic, a potential Intrustion Detection System (IDS)
could be created that can further process packets in an InfiniBand network.
Future research could deploy the Security SDK and evaluate its effectiveness,
together with already-proven security practices for the IBA. As stated in prior
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research, the Security SDK should attempt to secure all types of InfiniBand
traffic [7].
• Root of Trust: The BlueField SmartNIC was used heavily in this research, and
newer versions of this hardware are expected to be used in the future. Since
these devices sit in the middle of the network and are key pieces in network
communication, hosting their own OS on board, it makes sense to research the
security of those boot processes. Root of Trust can be explored on the BlueField
SmartNIC to determine if the hardware architecture chosen for the SoC has any
vulnerabilities that would need to be mitigated to ensure network security for
any environment that InfiniBand might be used in.
5.5 Conclusion
The three case studies in this paper explored the capabilities of modern network
monitoring tools within an InfiniBand network and looked to find a viable option.
Case Study 1 demonstrated that common monitoring tools can capture InfiniBand
traffic at lower bandwidths, due to inefficiencies in the packet capture libraries or
low buffer space in the OS kernel. Case Study 2 showed that putting these same
tools on the InfiniBand NIC incurred the same penalties as in Case Study 1, however
another tool, ntopng that uses flows and a more efficient packet capture library was
capable of very low packet loss at much higher bandwidths. Case Study 3 then
showed that increasing this speed to max bandwidth incurred minor packet loss,
posing as a possible and viable option for monitoring an InfiniBand network. This
study indicates that options exist to monitor InfiniBand networks and that further
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